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Central governments often subsidize capital spending by local gov-
ernments, instead of subsidizing operating expenses or labor-intensive
projects. This paper oﬀers one explanation, focusing on the incentive
eﬀects for local oﬃcials—a local oﬃcial can more easily shift the cost of
optimizing a project to his successor on a labor-intensive project than on
a capital-intensive project.
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11 Introduction
Central governments often subsidize the capital costs of local projects but not
the operating costs. In transportation, for example, the federal government
subsidizes construction of roads, but not their maintenance; and it subsidizes
the purchase of buses but not operating costs. Why? One argument is the
concern with commitment and with durability. But it is not obvious that the
federal government would have a greater incentive to build durable projects
than would a local government.
Relatedly, voters who currently inﬂuence the central government may fear
losing future inﬂuence. So though the central government may promise an
operating subsidy, the local citizens may fear that the central government’s
preferences will change, canceling the subsidy or imposing stricter conditions
on it. The local voters may therefore prefer a capital-intensive project.
In some countries, local governments have only a limited tax base, making
it diﬃcult for them to adopt capital-intensive projects; the central government
may then want to subsidize such projects. In other countries the opposite may
hold. For example, in the United States local governments can issue tax-free
bonds at low interest rates.
This paper takes a diﬀerent approach, looking at the incentives of a local
oﬃcial, say the mayor, to exert eﬀort. We shall show that a mayor may work
harder if he is responsible for a capital-intensive project than if he is responsible
for a labor-intensive project. For on a project having low capital intensity, a
free-rider problem can appear. The mayor in each period may want to leave
to a future mayor the task of optimizing the project. In contrast, a capital
project can be optimized only when it is adopted, and so the mayor in oﬃce
when the project is adopted may be induced to exert eﬀort in optimizing a
capital-intensive project.
We ﬁrst review other possible explanations for a bias toward capital-intensive
projects. We next present the assumptions and use a simple model to illustrate
the bias in the management of diﬀerent projects. We conclude with a discussion
of capital subsidies as a remedy.
2 Literature
2.1 Ineﬃcient policies
Several political factors can explain the adoption of ineﬃcient policies. (1) When
the policy makes transfers to special interests, the eﬃcient direct transfers may
be politically costly. In contrast, transfers resulting from a program that is not
ostensibly aimed at redistribution may fool the public, and so may face weak op-
position. Tullock (1983) terms such programs “disguised” transfers. Coate and
Morris (1995) formalize the argument, seeing cash as a direct transfer, whereas
a public project may be undertaken either because the incumbent aims to make
a transfer to some group, or because the incumbent believes the project has
2social beneﬁts. Cash transfers reveal that the politician is of a type who caters
to special interests; for public projects the politician’s type remains uncertain.
(2) Ineﬃcient policies may commit future governments. Glazer (1989) shows
that a current government unsure about a future government’s support for a
program will favor durable projects. Attempts to shape future preferences can
lead to similar results. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) argue that the current
majority may favor policies that increase its size, or increase its future political
power, even if those policies are ineﬃcient when viewed as aﬀecting only current
incomes.
(3) Politicians can reduce future spending by committing to ineﬃcient poli-
cies; for example if spending is aﬀected by pressure group politics, then taxes
which cause much deadweight loss will result in low spending (see Rodrik 1986,
Wilson 1990, and Becker and Mulligan 1998).
(4) Relatedly, a government may increase its bargaining power over a special
interest by constraining itself to ineﬃcient programs that reduce the beneﬁt a
special interest could obtain (see Drazen and Limao 2003).
2.2 Delay
Other work examines how uncertainty can induce delay. Applying the standard
analysis of option value shows the conditions under which an executive who
expects to get more information soon should postpone any irreversible, costly,
action.1
2.3 Time horizon of public oﬃcials
Other work relates to our assumption that a leader cares about outcomes after
he yields power, and may take actions now to aﬀect future outcomes. Glazer
and Kannianen (2007) consider a public oﬃcial’s incentive to incur the cost of
searching for a good subordinate when the oﬃcial can shift that cost to his
successor.
2.4 Financial capacity
In some countries, the tax base of local governments is small, making it diﬃcult
for them to ﬁnance capital-intensive projects, and so inducing the central gov-
ernment to subsidize capital. But conditions vary by country. In the U.S., local
governments can issue bonds with only a small interest cost diﬀerential. Al-
ternatively, the federal government can give a state guarantee and then capital
subsidies are not necessary.
1See Arrow and Fisher 1974, Pindyck 1991, and Dixit 1992.
33 Assumptions
We make two central assumptions. First, the incumbent political leader (we
will call him the mayor) beneﬁts from the project after he leaves oﬃce. He may
care because he continues to live in the city he governed, aﬀected by decisions
like other residents are. Or perhaps the incumbent cares about future perfor-
mance because he owns real property, with an optimized project generating
better public services and therefore higher property values. 2 Of course, often
externalities (negative or positive spillovers) to other jurisdictions appear. Such
externalities can justify a central government’s concern with local performance.
But since the externalities can hold whatever the project’s capital intensity, we
ignore them here.
A second assumption is that a capital-intensive project can be optimized
only when it is adopted, whereas a labor-intensive project can be optimized
in any period. Take the example of urban transit, where a light-rail project
requires ﬁxing the routes for the tracks before the project is even completed,
whereas the less capital-intensive bus routes can be changed any time. This
asymmetry in timing means that a mayor cannot impose on a later mayor
the cost of optimizing a capital-intensive project. But a mayor who does not
optimize a labor-intensive project may expect a later mayor to incur the cost of
optimizing the project.
We compare the behavior of a mayor when faced with two types of projects.
One is a capital-intensive project, which can be optimized only when the project
is adopted. A labor-intensive project has no design of capital. But its operation
can be optimized in any period; optimizing a project in one period generates
eﬃcient operation in all future periods, and allows for no further improvement.
An optimized project (whether capital-intensive or labor-intensive) yields
beneﬁt VH in each period; a non-optimized project (whether capital-intensive
or labor-intensive) yields beneﬁt VL, with vH > vL. We normalize the beneﬁts,
with vL = 0. A mayor who optimizes a project bears a cost F. A mayor
discounts future beneﬁts by the discount rate r.
4 Free-riding in optimizing a project
4.1 Capital-intensive project
Consider ﬁrst a capital-intensive project, which can be optimized only by the










2Relatedly, Alesina and Tabellini (2004) argue that when a bureaucrat’s utility increases
with his perceived competence, career concerns can motivate bureaucrats.







Consider next optimizing a labor-intensive project. As before, a mayor who
optimizes a project has expected discounted beneﬁts of
vH(1+r)
r − F, the same
as with optimizing a capital-intensive project.
Recall that a mayor who does not optimize a project beneﬁts from optimiza-
tion made by a successor, but saves the cost of the eﬀort F, as this is individ-
ualized eﬀort, not outsourced project preparation. Then a current mayor who




(1 + r)t = vH/r. (3)
The mayor therefore optimizes the project if F < vH. Notice that this condition
is more stringent than the condition for optimizing a capital-intensive project,
which was F < 1+r
r (vH). The interesting case has the inequality F < vH
violated, so that no Nash equilibrium has a pure strategy, in which the mayor
in any period optimizes a labor-intensive project with probability 1.
The Nash equilibrium will instead have mixed strategies.3 Let the probabil-
ity that any one future mayor optimizes the project be s. If the current mayor
does not optimize the project, then with probability s his successor in the next
period will; with probability (1−s)s his successor in two periods will, and so on.















In an equilibrium with mixed strategies, a mayor is indiﬀerent between optimiz-







Solving for s yields
s =
(r(vH − F) + vH)
F
. (6)
We must check that this value of s lies in [0,1] when F < 1+r
r (vH), that
is, when the mayor would not optimize the project. Using (6) we ﬁnd indeed
3Though we discuss mixed strategies, similar results can appear with correlated equilibria.
For example, s could be the probability that the next mayor will be a Democrat, and the
equilibrium could have a Democrat optimize a labor-intensive project, whereas a Republican
would not.
5that s = 0 for F
vH = 1+r
r . The incumbent would optimize neither a capital-
intensive nor a labor-intensive project. We will ﬁnd that s = 1 for F
vH = 1.
This means that for a whole range of projects with 1 < F
vH < 1+r
r a mayor
is indiﬀerent between a labor-intensive project and a capital-intensive project.
In each of these problems, the mayor optimizes a labor-intensive project only
with probability s < 1. If, instead, the mayor had a capital-intensive project,
he would have optimized it.
”
We illustrate in Figure 1 the probability s that a mayor optimizes a labor-
intensive project that had not already been optimized. The ﬁgure is limited to
values of F
vH within the range 1 < F
vH < 1+r
r ; it considers two discount rates
(5% and 20%). At a low discount rate, up to F
vH = 1+r
r = 21), the mayor
would optimize a labor-intensive-project. For high values of F
vH , we see that
the probability s decreases. In the whole range of F
vH values considered. Recall
that a value of s < 1 means that a mayor may not optimize a labor-intensive
project, resulting in ineﬃciency.
Consider next a higher discount rate for the mayor (20%). We see that
the mayor would optimize a capital-intensive project if ( F
vH = 1+r
r ≤ 6). For
projects with F
vH ≤ 6, the value of s increases slowly.
4.3 Welfare cost of low eﬀort
How important is the lack of optimizing a labor-intensive project? In the range
of projects with 1 < F
vH < 1+r
r , the mayor enjoys the same utility under a
capital-intensive project he optimizes as under a labor-intensive project he does
not. But because the mayor does not consider the eﬀort F shifted onto his
successors, a mayor’s utility can diﬀer from social welfare.
Welfare under a capital-intensive project is
vH(1+r)
r − F. Welfare under a
labor-intensive project optimized by a mayor with probability s (considering















so that for small values of s the eﬃciency loss approaches 100%. This makes
sense, as low values of s mean that any mayor is unlikely to optimize a labor-
intensive project, though such optimization increases aggregate welfare. But
s itself declines with r (see Figure 1), so after substitution by the equilibrium
value of s (6), we obtain the welfare loss as a function of the discount rate r.
So in our example of Figure 1, the welfare loss is approximately 5% for r = 5%,
and 17% for r = 20%.
6The intuition is that higher discount rates reduce the probability of optimiz-
ing a labor-intensive project. For a capital-intensive project, the future beneﬁts
of optimizing it also decrease. But, in the range of values considered, the mayor
always optimizes a capital-intensive project. In contrast, the probability of op-
timizing a labor-intensive project declines with the discount rate, and so the
welfare loss rises with the discount rate.
Of course, the absolute welfare loss AL is a function of the net beneﬁt of
optimizing a project. This absolute loss declines with F

















So higher discount rates reduce what is at stake when the mayor optimizes
a project, absolute losses decline but relative losses increase. The value F
vH is
the relative cost of optimizing a project compared to the beneﬁts, and so a high
cost of optimizing a project makes low probabilities of optimizing result in a
small loss of welfare.
If the mayor uses a diﬀerent discount rate r from the social discount rate (i),
the expressions for absolute and relative welfare loss change. If the parameters









1 + iF − r( F
vH − 1)
This loss increases with the discount rate used by the mayor. A mayor with
a short time horizon will not optimize a labor-intensive project, generating a
high eﬃciency loss.
4.4 Corrective policies
How to correct the welfare loss under labor-intensive projects? We can think of
regulatory, institutional, and incentive policies. In assessing policies we should
consider the limited information that the central government may have about
local conditions, and to consider possible distortions that these policies generate.
A starting point may be for the central government to forbid, or to refuse to
fund, labor-intensive projects when a capital-intensive project oﬀers the same
services at the same cost of optimizing a project. Such a blunt policy would,
however, reduce opportunities for creativity at the local level. A more intel-
ligent federal oversight may be to rely on yardstick competition, so that the
choice of ineﬃcient labor-intensive projects could be detected. But this type of
oversight may be diﬃcult in a mixed-strategy equilibrium: one may sometimes
observe serious optimization eﬀorts and sometimes not at all. Large variation
in the quality of a labor-intensive project remains a good signal to detect the
ineﬃciency we describe.
A more institutional approach would extend the term limits of the politi-
cians. An extension of the term limit implies that a mayor will see higher
rewards for optimizing a labor-intensive project. Extending term limits has
7obvious drawbacks when the politician in oﬃce is ineﬃcient or pursues other
goals.
A more straightforward, approach is to subsidize a capital-intensive project.
But such a subsidy also has drawbacks. The subsidies may induce a local gov-
ernment to adopt too many projects, and to favor capital-intensive projects
when labor-intensive projects would be more eﬃcient.
A fourth type of policy would be to reduce the costs of eﬀort for the lo-
cal policy maker. But as these are individualized and can consist of political
opportunity costs, this is diﬃcult to operationalize.
5 Conclusion
This paper claimed that capital-intensive projects induce greater eﬀort by public
oﬃcials than do labor-intensive projects. It is diﬃcult to observe eﬀort, and even
more diﬃcult to test the hypothesis. Yet some evidence supports the hypothesis.
Obeng and Sakano (2000) contrast how total factor productivity in the pub-
lic transit industry responds to operating subsidies and to capital subsidies.
Our model would predict that local oﬃcials put more eﬀort into using capital
eﬃciently than into improving ongoing operations, and therefore that capital
subsidies enhance productivity growth more than do operating subsidies. The
authors ﬁnd that.
When the eﬀects we discuss apply, voters will favor capital subsidies over op-
erating subsidies. That is the common pattern in the United States. Of course,
some operating policies have little political appeal; we rarely see a politician
celebrating the good maintenance of an old sewer line. But neither do politi-
cians seek publicity over the construction of a new, technologically sophisticated,
sewer. So we must ask why voters may prefer that the federal government sub-
sidize building but not maintaining sewer lines; the model presented above gives
one answer.
The bias by the U.S. federal government toward subsidizing construction,
but providing no assistance for maintenance or other operating expense, is well
documented by Cromwell (1989). For example, in 1988 the federal government
provided grants to states to complete, rehabilitate, and reconstruct the inter-
state highway system at a 90 percent matching rate. Discretionary grants from
the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA) subsidized construction of ma-
jor rail and subway systems with up to a 75 percent matching rate. Formula
grants from UMTA paid 80 percent of the cost of regular transit vehicle replace-
ment. No corresponding subsidies, however, are provided for maintenance. This
pattern is conﬁrmed by Taylor and Kelly (2002) in their discussion of Federal
public transit policy.
The bias toward capital-intensive projects will vary with conditions. For ex-
ample, term limits will increase the bias—an incumbent who does not address
maintenance problems or ineﬃcient operations knows that his successor may.
Though we have no data to test for this eﬀect, our approach oﬀers a prediction
opposite to most models of term limits, namely that short terms of oﬃce lead
8politicians to focus on short-term problems, rather than on how best to imple-
ment a new construction project. The length of the time horizon can aﬀect not
only the level of eﬀort by a public oﬃcial, but also the distribution of eﬀort.
96 Notation
F Cost of optimizing a project
vH Beneﬁt from project in each period from an optimized project
r Intertemporal discount rate
i Intertemporal discount rate of the mayor if it diﬀers from r
s Probability an oﬃcial optimizes a project if his predecessor had not
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